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BOOK REVIEW
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST. By Lawrence A. Sullivan, St. Paul,
Minnesota: West Publishing Company. 1977.
The author states that the goal of his hornbook is to present a
"[t]extual treatment of [antitrust] adequate for the needs of the modern
student or to the needs of the practitioner in search of an integrated treat-
ment of the major areas of this subject."' I think this book achieves its goal
better than its predecessors. 2 All prior single volume antitrust treatises set
out to explain how the major cases in each area fit together as well as
indicating the interrelationships which exist between these areas. This
work, unlike the others, takes all the various aspects of antitrust and
integrates them into a coherent whole. Sullivan is not content merely to
state the evolution and current status of the law in any area; in addition,
he pulls together not only the political, social and economic factors which
underlie the rules but also indicates the practicalities of judicial adminis-
tration which have been significant in the development of antitrust doc-
trine. This treatise alone deals with the subject at the same level as the
casebooks3 now on the market.
The author goes beyond merely summarizing the, foundation cases: he
gets his readers, particularly law students, thinking about antitrust in the
proper way. For example, he gives detailed consideration to the inconsis-
tencies of the leading Supreme Court cases in several areas. In his discus-
sion of price fixing, he emphasizes that such cases as Chicago Board of
Trade' and Appalachian Coals6 cannot be adequately reconciled with
I L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST XV (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Sullivan].
I The ones with which I am most familiar are E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAWS AND Eco-
NOMICS IN A NUTSHELL (1976); KINTNR, AN ANmTIRUST PRIMER (2d ed. 1973); A. STICKELLS,
FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1972); A. NEAT , THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA (2d ed. 1970); Arty GEN. NAT'L. ANTITRUST CoMm. REP. (1955). The American Bar
Association has supplemented the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's Committee; see,
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (1968) and (1975). Of these books,
I prefer Neale's, although his analysis of the cases, particularly their economic aspects, leaves
something to be desired. Kintner's book is intended to be a guide for businessmen, not lawyers
or law students. Despite the eminence of its members, the Attorney General's Report is quite
superficial, providing little support for the rules stated therein. Professor Gellhorn's book is
intended to provide an "overview" of antitrust, but I think it is too brief to be of much
assistance to anyone. Professor Stickell's work is inadequate for the reasons stated in Shaefer,
Book Review, 15 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 203 (1973).
3 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, PROBLEMS, TEXT & CASES (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as Areeda]; M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PrrOFSKY & H. GoLDSCHMID, CASES & MATERIALS
ON TRADE REGULATION (1975); S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (3rd ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as Oppenheim & Weston]; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST, CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS (1974) [hereinafter cited as Posner]; B. SCHWARTZ & J. FLYNN,
FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (5th ed. 1977).
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
B Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
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Trans-Missouri Freight Association,8 Trenton Potteries and Socony
Vacuum.'0 His analysis indicates to students that there are two streams of
price fixing cases, and while Socony Vacuum represents the main current
the Supreme Court keeps the Chicago Board channel available for the
proper case." The point is, of course, that the judges recognize the need to
give themselves room to maneuver in the ongoing effort to develop a policy
of competition.
Sullivan is also quite willing to criticize cases when this is necessary to
improve understanding. Most students are totally nonplussed by Learned
Hand's decision in Alcoa, '2 especially his holding on the element of conduct
necessary to finding monopolization. A specific intent to monopolize is
unnecessary; that monopoly is achieved is enough. Judge Hand subse-
quently tells us that we ought not turn on Alcoa just because it was suc-
cessful, but then proceeds to turn on the defendant for engaging in an
efficient and rational business strategy-stimulating demand and subse-
quently expanding to meet it. A similar point of view seems to underlie
United Shoe, '3 the second leading modern case under section 2. Defendants
are branded as monopolists because of their "exclusionary"" practices,
many of which were favored by and requested by their customers. Like
Judge Hand in Alcoa, Judge Wyzanski seems to be condemning practices
which were "exclusionary" because they were successful in obtaining busi-
ness for the user.'5 Sullivan is of considerable assistance to the students on
this question due, in large measure, to his willingness to attack Judge
Hand's rationale rather than forcing the facts to harmonize this case with
earlier and later cases. Alcoa's "deliberateness"' 6 test should be rejected,
says the author, since it "does not provide the firm which wishes to obey
the law with rational guides to conduct, nor does it leave open the oppor-
tunity for a market response which is both rationally self-regarding and
Sullivan, supra note 1, § 66 at 175-82.
Trans-Missouri Freight Association v. United States, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
,o United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
" Compare Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (Part I), 74 YALE L. J. 775 (1965) with Handler, The Judicial Architects of the Rules
of Reason, in ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE (1957). Sullivan would appear to agree more with Bork
on this matter.
,2 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
,S United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afi'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
" The exclusionary test is defined as covering actions "which at the time they were taken
could be identified as tending to increase entry barriers." Sullivan, supra note 1, § 36 at 100.
Sullivan terms Judge Wyzanski's two alternative standards the classic test, since it was based
on the judge's reading of Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), and the prima facie approach, for it would
put the burden of proof on the defendant once the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant
possessed monopoly power. Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 35 & 37.
,1 In addition to my students, this view is exemplified by such commentators as D.
ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST (1973).
," Sullivan, supra note 1, § 34.
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lawful.' ' 7 On the other hand, Judge Wyzanski's "exclusionary" test satis-
fies this objection. Since it focuses on conduct which tends to raise entry
barriers and for which firms will be able to find alternatives, this decision
sets forth a standard which judges can administer and "does not strain
against the realities of the market place."1 8 Yet, while he personally favors
the "exclusionary" test, the author stresses that the Supreme Court has
not placed its imprimatur on the exclusionary standard and that the exact
state of the law on this point is uncertain."9 Once again, his treatment
clearly indicates to the student the fluid character of antitrust. Even on a
question as fundamental to section,2 as this, the law has not been settled.
In addition the author's treatment effectively emphasizes the fact that
antitrust rules can never be reduced to simple single paragraph solutions.
A significant difference between this book and its predecessors is the
author's emphasis on the process considerations which bear so heavily in
antitrust decisions."0 What is required, Sullivan asserts in several places,
are standards which judges can employ to decide cases. On this point, he
clearly sides with the Harvard School rather than the Chicago School. In
another place the author more fully explains the basis for their disagree-
ment on this matter:
2'
It [the Harvard School] sees a need to mediate in deliberate and
rational ways between the ideal, and the attainable, which requires
attention to both empirical issues and to the limits of judicial and
administrative process. It seeks to fashion rules which can be ap-
plied to the kinds of facts which can be ascertained judicially and
administratively. The objective is to achieve results through the
judicial and administrative processes which approximate those
that would be attainable if it were feasible to do more rigorous and
complete empirical studies and then prescribe the ideal interven-
tion . . . [The Chicago School] assumes instead that a problem
cannot be dealt with at all if the law cannot get hold of all facts
which theory suggests are relevant.
2
This accent on process runs throughout the book. It serves as a partial basis
for Sullivan's preference for Judge Wyzanski's "exclusionary" test noted
above. Two other examples seem noteworthy. In discussing the problem of
11 Id. at § 28, 102. Sullivan also criticizes Judge Wyzanski's classic test as stating too
narrowly the rule of the old cases id at § 35.
'A Id.
" Id. at § 38.
20 Process considerations are crucial in all areas of law. See Green, The Duty Problem in
Negligence Cases (Part I), 28 COLtJM. L. REv. 1014, 1035-45 (1928).
21 Sullivan, Book Review, 75 COJM. L. REv. 1214 (1975). This difference in the point of
view of the two schools is not explicitly set forth in the book. Since it is so crucial to Sullivan's
exposition, I think that he should have stated the dichotomy more clearly.
" Id. at 1216-17. See also Sullivan, Economics & More Humanistic Disciplines: What
Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust? 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1214 (1977).
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defining the relevant market,2 Sullivan carefully indicates why economics
will not necessarily resolve all difficulties in this area. The Supreme
Court's use of the concept of cross elasticity of demand as an aid to defin-
ing the relevant market in the Cellophane24 case demonstrated that a little
scientific knowledge may lead to a wrong result. Lack of knowledge, how-
ever, might be cured. The difficulty involved, however, is inherent in the
way the judicial system operates.
It concerns whether our adjudicatory institutions-the judge, jury,
advocacy system, rules of evidence, expert testimony, cross exami-
nation, argument and instructions-are appropriate and adequate
for processing the materials and making the judgments involved
in the kind of analysis which an adequately sophisticated use of
economic theory demands.
25
What is demanded, the author suggests, is the development of judicial
norms which will permit the courts to make better use of economic doc-
trine. Defining the relevant market calls for an act of judgment. Economic
theory can be of assistance to the judge only if the norms are fashioned with
this goal in mind."
Sullivan also strongly underlines process considerations in his section
on price fixing.27 The per se rule against price fixing is justified, in large
part,28 on the grounds that it leads to efficient use of judicial resources by
simplifying cartel litigation, precludes courts from engaging in extended
regulation of entire industries, a task for which they are ill-suited, and
creates a bright line prohibition which is more likely to be obeyed than if
the rule were stated with less clarity.29 For similar reasons Sullivan would
limit the number of defenses which can be raised for arrangements which
have the requisite affect on price to two, those which make markets more
competitive and those which are ancillary to a partial integration of assets
of competitors.30 Neither of these can be raised in most cases, and both are
easily recognizable when they do exist. Creation of bright line defenses are
a natural corollary to the bright line prohibition of the per se rule. This
repeated emphasis on process seems most appropriate given the Supreme
Court's propensity to amplify this consideration.
3 1
2 Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 12-21.
21 United States v. E. L Dupont De Nemours & Co.,351 U.S. 377 (1956).
Sullivan, supra note 1, § 18 at 63
28 Sullivan, supra note 1, § 21.
21 Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 59-82. Sullivan's approach is rather similar to Areeda's in
this area. See Areeda, supra note 3, at 260-380. How Sullivan differs from the Chicago School
is evident when one compares Posner, supra note 3, at 33-137.
21 Of course, Sullivan also details the economic arguments against cartels. See Sullivan,
supra note 1, § 75 especially.
2 Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 68-72. Compare analysis suggested by Areeda, supra note
3, at 318.
32 See Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 76 & 77 respectively.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v.
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Another strong point of the book is its extended examination of reme-
dies. Many commentators have asserted that antitrust remedies are com-
monly inadequate. 2 One criticism of the monopoly cases, for example, has
been that the courts have mandated only conduct remedies where struc-
tural changes in the industry were required. The complaint is then made
that the judges are timid. As Sullivan views the matter, the problem often
lies more with the antitrust plaintiff, especially the Government. Judge
Wyzanski implied in United Shoe34 that the Government's efforts on the
remedy issue were inferior to the presentation of the rest of its case. As
Sullivan wisely observes:
[S]urely a judge, with little guidance other than broad statements
of economic theory; will hesitate before entering upon the unaccus-
tomed judicial business of disrupting myriad existing relationships
in an effort to make over the structure of an entire industry.
5
Before the plaintiff can request that an industry be restructured, he should
thoroughly understand the operation of the industry itself and its connec-
tion with related industries. If this pattern were followed, the very theory
of the case would suggest the remedial proposal.
While the good aspects of this book predominate, there are some parts
which might not call forth uniform praise. At many points Sullivan does
not attempt to state the law neutrally: instead he is an advocate for his
own point of view. In his treatment of exclusive dealing, for example, he
concentrates too much attention on his own system for solving problems
of this kind but does not indicate the present state of the law.3 1 While he
does analyze Standard Stations31 and Tampa Electric39 in detail, he totally
Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546
(1966); Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); United States v.
Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
2 See, e.g., Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture; The Pyrrhic Victories of
Antitrust, 27 IND. L. J. (1951); Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories? 12 J. LAw &
EcoN. (1969).
3 See Sullivan, supra note 1, § 55.
24 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
Sullivan, supra note 1, § 55 at 145.
"[D]issolution is not a self-defining remedy. To restructure an industry sensibly one
must deeply understand it and the interrelationships of its various parts . . . . The ideal
preservation in a monopoly case would be one in which the remedial proposal arose organi-
cally out of the theory of the case. The government, through the staff work of its economists
and lawyers (and utilizing discovery as extensively as necessary) would develop a dynamic
conception of the industry in question, a conception which would both identify the loci of
excessive power, the media through which that power was obtained or maintained, and the
means through which excessive power could be terminated." Id. at 146.
11 Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 163-71. See especially § 165 in which the author analyzes
the television manufacturing industry and proposes a standard based on the Justice Depart-
ment guidelines for vertical mergers, modified for requirement contracts.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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ignores Brown Shoe II, 1 a quixotic decision 4' which does not seem consis-
tent with either of its two earlier decisions.42 To a lesser degree this criti-
cism applies to his discussion of boycotts. 3 In a similar manner when
Sullivan turns to what was known as the Schwinnl problem, his una-
bashed advocacy of the old per se rule may get in the way of understand-
ing.4" Despite the numerous lower court decisions" distinguishing Schwinn
and law review articles attacking it," Sullivan gives the reader the impres-
sion that no bona fide issues as to Schwinn's correctness could be raised.
At no place does the author set out the arguments against Schwinn in
sufficient detail to permit the reader to judge their validity for himself.
It is understandable that Sullivan had some difficulty maintaining his
objectivity with regard to Schwinn. He was counsel for the plaintiff in
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.," a fact he points out to the
reader," during the time he was writing this book. In his brief5" to the
Supreme Court in GTE Sylvania, Sullivan relied heavily on Schwinn.
Although the forum is different, the hornbook reflects the position the
author took as counsel before the Supreme Court. While I may sympathize
with his difficulty (and even agree with his position), I must criticize the
writer of a hornbook aimed primarily at students for his failure to set forth
the arguments on this controversial question more evenhandedly.'
0 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (V66).
' See, e.g., Pearson, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as Antitrust, A
Comment, 47 B. U. L. Rav. 1 (1967); Areeda, supra note 3, at 575-76.
42 Sullivan characterizes Brown Shoe II as a tying case. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 16.
While the case can certainly be fitted into that pigeonhole, the Supreme Court seems to treat
it as an exclusive dealing case. Because everyone will not read the book straight through,
Sullivan ought to put the reader on notice of the way in which he has decided to treat this
case.
3 Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 83-92.
" United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
See Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 142-45, especially § 145 in which the author reviews
and evaluates "the arguments which are pressed in favor of these kinds of restrictions." Id.
at 412.
11 See, e.g., Good Inv. Promotions, Inc. v. Coming Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891 (10th Cir.
1974); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Felaco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1972), Janel Sales
Corp. v. Lenvin Perfumes, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2nd Cir. 1968);. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United
States, 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
11 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2557 n.13 (1977)
(citing numerous articles).
' 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
' Sullivan, supra note 1, at 404 n.10.
Brief for Petitioners.
Nonetheless, this section of the book is most interesting, for the author has carefully
marshalled all the pro Schwinn arguments in one place. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 145.
At least the author's treatment of vertical restraints is internally consistent. This is more
than can be said for the Supreme Court's decisions in the area through G.T.E. See Posner,
Antitrust Policy & The Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizon-
tal Merger & Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. J. 282 (1975) in which the author
critisizes the Court for its failure to develop a coherent theory dealing satisfactorily with the
various kinds of vertical restraints manufacturers place upon their own dealers for the purpose
[Vol. XXXV
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I have two other adverse comments about the book. First, Sullivan
states the law of tie-ins5 with greater certainty than actually exists.
In short, tying violates Sherman . . . whenever a quantatively
substantial amount of commerce is affected by the tie and when
the tying product is either patented, copyrighted, or in some other
way significantly differentiated in the view of some buyers. More-
over, if a substantial number of ties have been imposed, the exist-
ence of power can be inferred from that fact alone."
While the leading cases might be read this way and this may indeed be-
come the rule in the future, it seems to me that Fortner I1 precludes this
statement of the rule. Fortner I teaches that the tying product must be
more than significantly differentiated; it must be unique." Further, defen-
dants are entitled to show justification for a substantial number of ties. 6
Second, while I found the author's treatment of monopoly excellent, his
section on attempts to monopolize is superficial. 7 With regard to most
areas, Sullivan carefully shows how the law evolved to its present state,
often noting arguments which the courts had considered and rejected, and
in some places he includes an essay on what he and other commentators
think will be the problems n the next decade." Since the law of attempts
to monopolize ha s'been developing rapidly in recent years, I would have
expected Sullivan to do more with it. Yet, he has little to say about the
implications of Otter Tail"5 and other recent cases involving attempts, nor
does he call to the reader's attention analysis offered by other writers who
have made recent contributions to the thinking in this area."
In addition, I would suggest increased coverage for two areas-The
state action exemption and the Robinson-Patman Act. The state action
exemption is discussed in a catch-all chapter which the author describes
as "something of a miscelliny, deal(ing) briefly with several loosely related
topics"6' This is a technique employed by several casebooks: full treatment
of restricting intraband competition. For a general discussion of the G.T.E. decision, see
Carstensen, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments, 35 WASH. & LEE L. Rxv. 1 (1978).
52 Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 150-62.
3 Id., § 142 at 440.
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 861 (1977).
Id. at 866.
5' Id. at 867 n.10.
Sullivan, supra note 1, § 50-52.
' See, e.g., §§ 101-07 in which the author considers various types of joint activities
involving competitors including joint research, joint advertising, joint activities making a
market and his chapter on oligopoly markets §§ 115-29.
' Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
" See, e.g., Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionist Answer to the
Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REv. 373 (1974); Blecher, Attempt to Monop-
olize under § 2 of the Sherman Act: "Dangerous Probability" of Monopolization Within the
"Relevant Market" 38 GEo. WASH. L. Rzv. 215 (1969).
11 Sullivan, supra note 1, § 232 at 708.
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is limited to the major substantive areas of the law. 2 Yet, Sullivan himself
describes Cantor v. The Detroit Edison Company3 as a decision which
''may prove to be one of the most important antitrust decisions in recent
years."64 Fuller treatment of this burgeoning area seems appropriate even
if it would destroy the symmetry of the concluding chapter. The author's
consideration of the Robinson-Patman Act" is very sketchy. He frankly
admits as much. 7 One gets the impression that he did not wish to consider
this statute at all since its underlying policy and the decisions interpreting
it so often conflict with the other antitrust laws." He tells his readers to
consult the earlier texts of Rowell and Edwards7" if they are interested in
the technical aspects of this highly technical statute. If the price discrimi-
nation law did not merit the consideration devoted to the other substantive
parts of antitrust, I think this chapter should have been omitted entirely.7 '
No reader could follow the text unless he or she were quite familiar with
the Act already.
Despite these criticisms, I would recommend this book to my students
in Antitrust. Overall, it is an excellent treatment of the field. On the other
hand, I doubt that it would be as valuable to the practicing attorney. Much
of its content is too basic to be of assistance to the specialist in antitrust.
Those parts of the book, however, in which Sullivan considers questions
on the frontiers of antitrust could be used like any sophisticated law review
article, as a source for ideas and authority. This book may be more helpful
to the attorney who does not specialize in this field. It is a good place to
begin ones self-education about antitrust. Yet, because the book is aimed
primarily at students, there is a lot of material which the attorney probably
will not want. My guess is that the non specialist would want a more
definite statement of the rules and less about the possibilities than Sulli-
van ordinarily gives him.72 Furthermore, the book is not a good source for
authority. In most chapters the author cites only the leading Supreme
62 See especially Areeda, supra note 3, at ch. I; Oppenheim & Weston, supra note 3, at
ch. 1.
63 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
64 Sullivan, supra note 1, § 238 at 736.
See, for example, the numerous cases cited in Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1976) at footnotes 4 & 3
respectively.
" Sullivan, supra note 1, ch. 8.
"This chapter is a brief introduction to major issues under the law [Robinson-Patman
Act] and stresses their relationship with antitrust policy." Sullivan, supra note 1, § 217 at
677.
See Sullivan, supra note 1, § 218.
69 F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1962).
o C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW (1959).
7, Compare S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, THE FEDERAL TRADE LAWS (1968) with S. OPPEN-
HEIM & G. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES (1974). The editors put the Robinson-Patman
Act case., and materials in the latter volume on the ground that this statute does not fit
into the antitrust scheme.
72 This technique is precisely what makes this such a good book for students.
[Vol. XXXV
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Court cases and totally ignores decisions of the lower federal courts. While
I feel this is acceptable practice in a student hornbook, this may not fill
the needs of the bar. Finally, the book loses much of its excellence if one
reads only a part of it rather than going straight through. In his introduc-
tory chapter Sullivan sets forth his general approach to the subject, espe-
cially the role of economics in antitrust." In the Chapter on monopoly he
sets out much of the economic material which serves as background for the
development of subsequent chapters.74 One who merely reads the chapter
on Mergers, for example, misses this economic background necessary to
appreciate all that Sullivan has to say. An "integrated treatment of the
major substantive areas" necessarily suffers if .used in this way. Notwith-
standing these possible defects, I think that the practicing lawyer who
intends to buy an antitrust book does best by choosing Sullivan.
JOSEPH E. ULRICH*
73 Sullivan, supra note 1, especially §§ 1 & 2.
" Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 22-32.
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University

